North Dakota Law Review
Volume 41

Number 2

Article 6

1964

Witnesses - Privilege of Witness - Privilege against SelfIncrimination
Lynn E. Crooks

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Crooks, Lynn E. (1964) "Witnesses - Privilege of Witness - Privilege against Self-Incrimination," North
Dakota Law Review: Vol. 41 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol41/iss2/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

RECENT CASES
WITNESSES-PRIVILEGE

OF

WITNESS-PRIVILEGE

AGAINST

SELF-

INCRIMINATION-The defendant was called upon to testify at a
hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor. He was granted immunity from prosecution under the laws
of both New York and New Jersey.' Notwithstanding this grant of
immunity he refused to answer certain questions claiming that his
answers would tend to incriminate him under federal law. The
defendant was thereupon adjudged in contempt. The United States
Supreme Court held that a witness in a state proceeding may claim
the privilege against self-incrimination if his answers might tend to
incriminate him under federal law, even though there is no danger of
prosecution for a state crime. 2 The Court further held that federal
courts may not make any use of testimony elicited through the use
of state immunity statutes. The immunity granted to the defendant
was thus as broad as the privilege against self-incrimination, consequently he could be forced to answer the Commission's questions.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 84 Sup. Ct. 1594
(1964).
The first holding of the Murphy case represents a radical change
in American jurisprudence. Under prior decisions a jurisdiction
attempting to force a witness to testify despite his fear of selfincrimination had to show only that the grant of immunity prohibited
the use of the testimony or its fruits against him in a criminal
prosecution within that jurisdiction. 3 Such a showing satisfied the
constitutional requirement that an immunity grant must be as broad
as the privilege against self-incrimination if it is to be valid., The
fact that a different jurisdiction might subsequently be able to use
the testimony against the witness in a criminal prosecution did not,
in the absence of collusion between the two jurisdictions, deny the
defendant due process of law.5 The first holding of the Murphy
case quite obviously changed these rules.6 If the Court had stopped
1. The defendant had been granted immunity from both New York and New Jersey
prosecutions pursuant to an interstate compact. See Application of Waterfront Comm'n
of N.Y. Harbor, 39 N.J. 436, 189 A.2d 36 (1963).
2. In a companion case, Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct 1489 (1964), the Court held
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Even before Malloy, however,
a flagrant denial of the privilege probably would have violated the spirit of the due
process cause; see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
3. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372
(1905).
4. Ibid. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), which sets forth the rule
that a statute may not replace the privilege against self-incrimination unless it Is so
broad as to have the same extent in both scope and effect
5. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
6. A claim of privilege as to possible incrimination under the laws of a foreign
jurisdiction will presumably be judged by the same standard as is now used when the
claim is made with regard to the laws of the forum. See Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479 (1951), for a statement of the federal standard.
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with its holding that a witness may claim the privilege against self-

incrimination if he fears incrimination under the laws of another
jurisdiction, many state immunity grants would have been rendered
ineffective. A state statute standing alone could not have given a
witness protection against the use of his testimony in a federal
prosecution. 7 A realization of this fact is what prompted the Court
to abandon the rule of Feldman v. United States,8 and hold that

any testimony forced under a state immunity grant must be excluded
from the federal courts.
The Court did not state whether the exclusionary rule set forth
was based on constitutional grounds or whether it was merely an

exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the lower
federal courts. 9 An analysis of the opinion indicates, however, that

the exclusionary rule was based on the former rather than the latter.
The Court explicitly stated that its first holding was based on con-

stitutional requirements. I° Although the case was concerned only
with fear of incrimination under federal law it would seem that the
first holding would also allow a witness to refuse to answer if he
feared incrimination under the laws of another state.": If this is

true it is difficult to comprehend how the Court could have reached
its second point and upheld the statute if it was relying solely on its

supervisory power. To do so it would have had to restrict the case
entirely to its facts. 12 Its supervisory power over the lower federal
courts does not extend to the state courts and could not have
prevented the use of the forced testimony there. 13 If the Court's
second holding, establishing the exclusionary rule, is based only on
supervisory power, it is difficult to understand why the Court found

it necessary to answer the constitutional question of whether or not
a witness is entitled to claim a privilege against incrimination under

the laws of another jurisdiction. The result of the case would have
testimony once forced
been the same had the Court said only that
4
must be excluded from the federal courts.
7. Jack v. Kansas, supra note 3 (dictum).
8. 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
9. Examples of the Supreme Court's supervisory power can be found in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
10. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 84 Sup. Ct. 1594, 1609 (1964).
11. Id. at 1608, the Court stated: "[T]here is no continuing legal validity to, or
historical justification for, the rule that one jurisdiction within our federal structure may
compel a witness to give testimony which could be used to convict him of a crime in
another jurisdiction." This language Indicates that the Court is abolishing the rule entirely. In cases where a witness feared prosecution in another state, the courts have rested
their refusal to extend the privilege to him on the very rule which the Court has abolished.
E.g., Application of Herlands, 204 Misc. 373, 124 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1953); State v. Wood,
99 Vt. 490, 134 Atl. 697 (1926).
12. At the hearing the defendant did not make any claim that he would be Incriminated under the laws of another state. Perhaps the Court reasoned that since the defendant did not raise such a defense at the first hearing he would not do so at the new
hearing which it ordered. The question of waiver, however, was not raised by this case
because the defendant had not yet given any testimony.
13. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 186 (1953) wherein the Court refused to
apply the rule of McNabb v. United States, supra note 9, to state courts.
14. This approach, of course, would have made the entire opinion mere dicta because
the specific question of exclusion was not before the Court.

NORTH DAKOTA

LAW REVIEW

The answer to the question of whether or not the exclusionary
rule applies between the states will ultimately depend upon whether
it rests on constitutional grounds. If it does not rest on those grounds
a witness in one state who feared incrimination under the laws of
another state could not be forced to testify because the immunity
grant would not be as broad as the privilege against self-incrimi5
nation.1
The case raises another very interesting question. Might some
immunity statutes, though valid under the fifth amendment, be void
because they violate the supremacy clause? 16 This question may
well arise in a situation where the local law enforcement officials
are very hostile to a federal law and would use their immunity
statutes to frustrate, if not wholly curtail, federal prosecutions."
Attempts to render the Civil Rights Act of 196418 inoperative might
well illustrate how this could happen. It is true, of course, that
the federal courts are very reluctant to strike down state legislation
based on the police power. Since the primary responsibility for
protecting the public safety, health and morals rests with the states 19
rather than the federal government, the rule is that federal courts
should not overturn state police statutes unless they are clearly
inconsistent with federal law or enter into fields which have been
closed to state action. 20 The question posed here, however, does
not fit neatly within the ambit of this reasoning. The situation presented resembles more closely the conflict involved in the famous
case of McCulloch v. Maryland2' wherein Maryland was using its
admittedly valid taxing authority to frustrate and destroy a valid
exercise of federal power. There, as here, the conflict did not come
so much from an inconsistency of state and federal law as it did
from the practical application and effect of the state statute on
the federal law. It would seem that the exercise of any state power,
be it taxing power or police power, for the purpose of rendering a
valid federal law ineffective would contravene the supremacy
22
clause.
A third question raised by the Murphy case is one that may
15.
16.

See note 4 supra.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

17. The exclusionary rule would not prohibit a subsequent federal prosecution, see
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, supra note 10, at 1610 (White J., con-

curring), but when both the testimony and its fruits are excluded from a federal pros-

ecution it places an almost impossible burden upon the federal government to establish
that its investigation was not influenced by either. See United States v. Coplon, 185
F.2d 629, (2d Cir. 1950), where it was held that once an illegal wiretap was proved, the

burden rested on the government to establish that its evidence in no way arose therefrom.
18. 78 Stat. 241.

Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878).
19.
20.
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) ; Patterson v. Kentucky, supra note 19.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 315 (1819). Cf., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520
21.
(1959).
22.
"[T]he states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden,
or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress
to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 21, at 435. Cf., Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879) ; accord, In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
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prove to be very significant in the field of criminal law. The question
is: If it is a violation of due process to deny a witness the privilege
against self-incrimination, to force him to testify if his testimony
can be used by another jurisdiction, and to allow another jurisdiction
to use the testimony once it has been forced under an immunity
statute, is it not equally a violation of due process to allow one
jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for a criminal act for which
he has already been acquitted or convicted in another jurisdiction?
The reason given for allowing both state and federal governments
to prosecute the same defendant for the same criminal act is that
the governments are separate sovereignties, and therefore there has
been a crime committed against both. 23 It should be patently
obvious that this is a mere fiction derived from a legal concept that
24
If
has ceased to be significant in American constitutional law.
the Court has abolished the dual sovereignty fiction in the area
of self-incrimination should it not also abolish it in the area of double
jeopardy? The dual crime argument might have logical force in the
case of a continuing crime between two states, but it has, by the
Murphy case, lost what strength it once had with reference to acts
25
which violate both state and federal law.
The Murphy case represents the Court's increased willingness
to expand on the concept of due process of law. Considering this
tendency it is not highly speculative to predict that in the near
future the law will see many new developments in this area. Because
of the many problems arising with each new opinion, one cannot
help but ask if perhaps the Court is not moving too fast. This is
not to say that the decisions themselves have been wrong but it is
to suggest that society needs time to adjust to new constitutional
standards just as it needs time to adjust to new legislation. In the
last analysis the results of both are the same.
LYNN E. CROOKS

CONSTITUTIONAL

VOLUNTARINESS

OF

LAW-DUE

PROCESS-JURY
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DETERMINATION

o n v i c t e d of

first

OF

degree

murder, the defendant petitioned for habeas corpus in federal court
asserting that his conviction in New York was invalid as founded
upon a confession improperly determined voluntary. During trial
23. United States v. Lanza, 260- U.S. 377 (1922) ; accord, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
24. The concept of federalism espoused by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinions
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672
(1961)
and more recently in Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 1497 (1964), has been
consistently rejected by the Court.
25. See Bartkus v. Illinois, supra note 23, at 150 (Black J., dissenting); Abbate v.
United States, supra note 23, at 201 (Black J., dissenting),

